

RESEARCH PAPER

An Examination of the Interrelationships Between Macroeconomic Policies and Public Health Outcomes in Low-Income Countries Over the Past Two Decades

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Abstract

Macroeconomic stability has long been considered a foundation for sustainable development, and in parallel, public health outcomes determine the resilience and productivity of populations. In low-income countries, the intersection between economic governance and health indicators has drawn increasing attention over the past two decades. Although growth trajectories differ widely, shared structural constraints such as limited fiscal capacity, debt dependence, and vulnerability to external shocks have shaped both economic policy options and health outcomes. The abstract of this study presents an overview of the complex relationships connecting macroeconomic management and population well-being, particularly in contexts where health systems are underdeveloped and financial resources scarce. This paper investigates how fiscal policies, monetary frameworks, and external financing interact with demographic transitions, disease burdens, and access to essential services. The analysis integrates quantitative models that demonstrate how variations in inflation targeting, fiscal deficits, and foreign aid allocations can influence healthcare expenditure, nutritional access, and morbidity rates. Linear algebraic formulations are applied to capture the interdependence between policy instruments and health outcomes, emphasizing the multidimensionality of the system. The research reveals both direct and indirect linkages, with public expenditure multipliers showing non-linear effects on health indices when constrained by debt servicing obligations. Moreover, structural adjustments and international lending frameworks have exerted significant pressure on fiscal space, often leading to trade-offs between macroeconomic discipline and social investment.

1. Introduction

The past two decades have been marked by profound shifts in the global economic and health landscape, particularly within low-income countries where vulnerabilities to external and internal shocks are more pronounced (1). The interplay between macroeconomic policies and public health outcomes has emerged as a critical area of inquiry, as policymakers and international organizations have increasingly recognized that growth trajectories and population well-being cannot be disentangled. Public health is not only a consequence of economic performance but also a determinant of future productivity, making the relationship mutually reinforcing.

The introduction of stabilization programs in many low-income countries during the early 2000s sought to reduce inflation, liberalize trade, and impose fiscal discipline. While these measures often succeeded in promoting macroeconomic stability, they also constrained the fiscal space available for investment in public health infrastructure. At the same time, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, periodic outbreaks of Ebola and cholera, and the rising burden of non-communicable diseases exposed the fragility of health systems and underscored the importance of adequate public investment. This tension has persisted across the past two decades, as governments have attempted

to balance debt sustainability and growth with urgent health demands.

The methodological approach of this paper is twofold: it incorporates both descriptive assessments of economic and health trajectories and analytical modeling of the relationships between policy instruments and health outcomes. By applying formal mathematical representations, it is possible to clarify how constraints imposed by debt servicing or currency depreciation translate into measurable impacts on healthcare delivery, nutritional status, and epidemiological outcomes (2). In particular, the integration of linear algebraic systems allows for the examination of multi-variable interdependencies, where fiscal balance, inflation rate, and foreign aid collectively determine the extent of resources available for public health interventions.

This introduction therefore sets the stage for an extensive examination of the interrelationships between macroeconomic policies and public health outcomes, with a focus on low-income countries over the past twenty years. It identifies the key areas of tension, highlights the empirical realities of economic management and health provision, and establishes the necessity of a technical and theoretical framework to capture the complex dynamics at play.

2. Macroeconomic Stability and Public Health Financing

One of the principal challenges faced by low-income countries is the persistent need to maintain macroeconomic stability while expanding investments in public health (3). Fiscal deficits, inflationary pressures, and external debt obligations constrain the ability of governments to allocate sufficient resources toward healthcare systems. The interplay between these macroeconomic variables can be formalized by considering the fiscal balance equation in the form

$$F_t = T_t - (G_t + I_t + D_t),$$

where F_t represents the fiscal balance at time t , T_t denotes total revenue, G_t captures public health expenditure, I_t reflects investment in other sectors, and D_t accounts for debt servicing. In contexts where D_t increases disproportionately, the capacity to maintain or expand G_t is diminished, generating systemic vulnerabilities in health outcomes. (4)

2.1 The Fiscal Health Trade-off

At its core, the fiscal balance equation demonstrates that health expenditure is not an isolated budgetary decision but embedded within a complex system of trade-offs. For many low-income countries, the dual imperative of meeting international debt obligations and maintaining macroeconomic stability constrains their ability to prioritize health financing. When governments face binding fiscal ceilings, the marginal adjustment often comes from discretionary expenditures such as healthcare, education, or social protection, rather than from rigid categories such as defense spending or debt servicing.

This trade-off has been particularly evident in Sub-Saharan Africa during periods of debt distress. For example, during the 1980s and 1990s structural adjustment programs mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), many African governments were compelled to reduce fiscal deficits rapidly. While these policies succeeded in lowering inflation and stabilizing exchange rates, they often did so at the cost of social expenditure. Health budgets, already limited, were reduced further, creating what scholars have described as the “austerity trap”: the paradox where stabilization policies aimed at fostering long-term growth undermine the very foundations of human capital formation.

2.2 Health Financing under Debt Overhang

The debt overhang problem, a common feature in low-income countries, is particularly damaging for public health financing. Theoretical models of debt overhang suggest that when debt levels are perceived as unsustainable, governments and investors anticipate that future income will be used primarily for debt repayment (5). This reduces incentives to invest in productive sectors, including health infrastructure. The situation can be represented algebraically as follows:

$$I_t^{\text{health}} = \gamma \left(\frac{Y_t - D_t}{Y_t} \right),$$

where I_t^{health} represents health investment, Y_t is national income, and γ is the proportion of disposable income allocated

to health. As D_t rises relative to Y_t , the share of resources available for health shrinks, leading to underinvestment in hospitals, clinics, and preventive care programs.

Empirical evidence supports this relationship. Countries such as Zambia and Mozambique in the late 1990s, with debt-to-GDP ratios exceeding 100%, allocated less than 2% of GDP to healthcare. Conversely, after the implementation of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, debt relief provided fiscal space for these countries to double or even triple their health expenditures as a share of GDP. The subsequent period witnessed measurable improvements in child immunization rates, maternal mortality reduction, and broader health outcomes.

2.3 Modeling Macroeconomic-Health Interdependencies

The algebraic representation of these interdependencies can be structured in a matrix form:

$$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{P},$$

where $\mathbf{H}$ is a vector of health outcomes such as life expectancy, maternal mortality, and morbidity rates; $\mathbf{P}$ is a vector of macroeconomic policy instruments including fiscal deficit, inflation, and debt ratio; and $\mathbf{A}$ is a transformation matrix mapping policy inputs to health outcomes.

The coefficients of $\mathbf{A}$ are not static but subject to shifts depending on the external environment, particularly commodity price volatility and aid flows. For example, when global commodity prices collapse, resource-exporting countries experience sudden declines in revenue, forcing downward adjustments in health financing (6). In such cases, even if fiscal deficits are maintained within acceptable thresholds, the composition of expenditure often shifts away from social sectors.

Furthermore, the matrix formulation highlights the potential for feedback loops. Poor health outcomes reduce labor productivity, which depresses tax revenues (T_t), thereby exacerbating fiscal deficits. This negative feedback cycle perpetuates a vicious circle of macroeconomic fragility and health system weakness.

2.4 Macroeconomic Stabilization and Conditionalities

The persistent challenge for low-income countries is that stabilization policies often prioritize fiscal contraction and inflation control, which can generate short-term improvements in macroeconomic indicators but restrict the flow of resources to health sectors. The past twenty years illustrate repeated episodes where International Monetary Fund conditionalities imposed expenditure ceilings, leading governments to reallocate scarce resources away from healthcare. The long-term consequences of such trade-offs have been visible in stagnant health indicators despite episodes of economic growth.

A concrete example can be drawn from Ghana in the early 2000s. While macroeconomic stabilization programs succeeded in reducing inflation from 40% to below 10%, government health expenditures as a proportion of GDP stagnated at around 3% (7). The result was an overreliance on

donor-funded vertical health programs, which improved certain disease-specific outcomes (such as HIV/AIDS treatment coverage) but left systemic challenges unaddressed, including inadequate primary care infrastructure and high out-of-pocket spending by households.

2.5 Case Study: Latin America's Fiscal Health Trade-offs

In Latin America, the interplay between macroeconomic stability and health financing has followed a slightly different trajectory. Many countries in the region implemented fiscal responsibility laws that limited structural deficits to preserve macroeconomic stability. While these rules enhanced credibility in international markets, they also restricted countercyclical spending during economic downturns. For instance, during the 2008 global financial crisis, Brazil's fiscal rule constrained health spending growth just when the demand for public healthcare was rising due to increased unemployment and declining household incomes. The rigid application of fiscal rules, while stabilizing debt trajectories, created bottlenecks in health financing precisely when needs were most acute.

2.6 The Role of International Aid

International aid has historically served as a buffer for health financing in low-income countries. However, aid dependence introduces its own vulnerabilities. Aid flows are often volatile and procyclical, increasing during times of global prosperity and contracting during downturns (8). Moreover, donor priorities may not always align with domestic health needs, leading to distortions in expenditure composition. For instance, excessive focus on infectious diseases has sometimes overshadowed non-communicable disease prevention, despite the latter's rising burden in many low-income settings.

From a macroeconomic perspective, aid flows can be modeled as an external component of revenue:

$$T_t = T_t^{\text{domestic}} + A_t,$$

where A_t denotes aid inflows. While A_t can temporarily relax fiscal constraints, its unpredictability and conditionality mean that reliance on aid does not constitute a sustainable path toward universal health coverage. Furthermore, when aid inflows are large, they can create exchange rate appreciation pressures (the so-called "Dutch disease" effect), indirectly undermining the competitiveness of domestic industries and reducing fiscal revenues in the long run.

2.7 Towards Sustainable Health Financing

The challenge, therefore, is to design macroeconomic frameworks that balance stabilization objectives with the imperative of investing in public health. Policy innovations such as countercyclical fiscal rules that exempt health expenditures, debt-for-health swaps, and social protection floors financed through progressive taxation have emerged as potential solutions (9). For instance, Chile's structural balance rule incorporates countercyclical mechanisms, allowing the government to protect health and education spending during downturns while maintaining long-term debt sustainability.

Ultimately, macroeconomic stability should be viewed not as an end in itself but as an enabler of long-term development. Without a healthy population, sustained economic growth is unattainable. Integrating health financing considerations into macroeconomic policymaking is therefore not only a matter of social justice but also of economic rationality.

3. Inflation, Exchange Rates, and Healthcare Access

Inflation dynamics exert a significant influence on healthcare access in low-income countries, where imported medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, and technological equipment account for a considerable proportion of health expenditures. Exchange rate depreciation amplifies this effect, raising the cost of imports and reducing the purchasing power of governments and households alike. The inflation-health nexus can be expressed through a functional relation:

$$C_h = \alpha + \beta_1 \pi_t + \beta_2 e_t + \epsilon_t, \quad (10)$$

where C_h denotes the cost of healthcare provision, π_t is the inflation rate, e_t is the nominal exchange rate, and ϵ_t is an error term capturing exogenous shocks.

3.1 Inflation and Household Health Expenditure

The persistence of double-digit inflation in several low-income economies during the early 2000s eroded household real incomes, limiting their ability to afford private healthcare or even essential nutrition. This induced second-order effects on public health, as malnutrition exacerbated vulnerability to infectious diseases.

Household survey data repeatedly show that when inflation rises, households reallocate expenditures away from preventive healthcare (such as regular check-ups and vaccinations) toward basic subsistence, particularly food. Yet even food expenditures often decline in real terms, resulting in chronic undernutrition and increased susceptibility to disease. This dual channel—reduced ability to purchase healthcare services and compromised nutrition—creates a compounding effect that worsens health outcomes.

3.2 Exchange Rate Depreciation and Medical Imports

Exchange rate volatility further aggravates these effects by raising the cost of donor-funded programs denominated in foreign currency. Even when aid disbursements are stable in nominal terms, depreciation of local currencies reduces their real value, limiting the scope of interventions. For example, if a malaria prevention program is funded in U.S. dollars, a 20% depreciation of the local currency reduces the program's purchasing power equivalently, forcing reductions in coverage or quality of service.

The impact of exchange rate depreciation can be formalized using a price pass-through model:

$$P_m = P_m^* \cdot e_t,$$

where P_m is the domestic price of medical imports, P_m^* is the foreign price, and e_t is the exchange rate (domestic currency per unit of foreign currency). High pass-through coefficients imply that depreciation directly translates into higher domestic prices, eroding the affordability of medicines and medical technologies. In countries with limited domestic pharmaceutical industries, this dependence on imports is nearly absolute, making exchange rate stability a critical determinant of healthcare access.

3.3 Mathematical Representation of Instability

Linear algebraic modeling further illustrates the systemic interconnection: if we define a state vector $\mathbf{x}_t$ containing household health indices, and a transition matrix $\mathbf{M}$ representing the inflation-exchange-health transmission mechanism, then

$$\mathbf{x}_{t+1} = \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x}_t,$$

where stability of the system depends on the eigenvalues of $\mathbf{M}$. If the dominant eigenvalue exceeds unity under high inflation conditions, the system evolves toward instability, resulting in declining health outcomes over time. This framework emphasizes that inflation and exchange rate mismanagement can generate cumulative, rather than merely transient, declines in population health.

3.4 Hyperinflation and Health Collapse

Perhaps the most extreme example of the inflation-health nexus is observed in cases of hyperinflation (12). Zimbabwe in the mid-2000s provides a stark illustration. With annual inflation rates exceeding 1,000%, the cost of medicines and medical equipment skyrocketed. Hospitals lacked basic supplies, including gloves and syringes, while healthcare workers abandoned their posts due to the collapse of real wages. Life expectancy plummeted from over 60 years in the 1990s to below 45 years by 2005. This episode demonstrates that macroeconomic mismanagement can directly translate into humanitarian crises.

3.5 Inflation Stabilization and Health Trade-offs

Inflation stabilization policies thus become critical for sustaining health service delivery, yet their design and timing carry trade-offs that can either safeguard or undermine population well-being. Sudden monetary tightening may reduce inflation but simultaneously contract credit availability, raising unemployment and reducing household capacity to spend on healthcare. Conversely, gradual stabilization, while less disruptive socially, may prolong periods of high inflation with cumulative damage to household welfare.

The choice of exchange rate regime also matters (13). Fixed exchange rates can provide nominal stability and protect against inflationary spirals, but they require substantial foreign reserves and often impose fiscal discipline constraints. Flexible regimes allow for adjustment to external shocks but expose domestic healthcare systems to volatility in import costs. Hybrid regimes, such as crawling pegs, attempt to balance these trade-offs but require credible and consistent policy implementation.

3.6 Case Study: Argentina's Inflationary Cycles

Argentina offers a relevant case study of how inflation and exchange rate dynamics affect healthcare access. Periods of high inflation in the late 1980s and early 2000s corresponded with sharp declines in real health spending. Exchange rate crises, particularly the collapse of the currency board in 2001, led to sudden shortages of imported medicines and medical equipment. Even though public health expenditure in nominal pesos increased, its real value in terms of U.S. dollars declined dramatically, undermining the ability to procure essential inputs. Households, facing declining real wages, reduced visits to private doctors and relied increasingly on overstretched public hospitals. (?)

3.7 Regional and Global Spillovers

Inflationary pressures and exchange rate instability are not confined within national borders. In regions with significant cross-border health service utilization, such as West Africa or the East African Community, exchange rate misalignments create disparities in healthcare costs across countries. Patients may engage in cross-border medical shopping, leading to uneven distribution of demand and straining certain health systems disproportionately. Moreover, regional procurement mechanisms, such as pooled purchasing of medicines, are affected by the weakest currency in the bloc, since suppliers price according to the highest risk of depreciation.

3.8 Policy Innovations for Mitigation

To mitigate the adverse effects of inflation and exchange rates on healthcare access, several policy innovations have emerged. One approach is the establishment of stabilization funds that accumulate foreign exchange reserves during commodity booms and draw them down during downturns to finance essential imports, including medical supplies. Another is the negotiation of long-term supply contracts in foreign currency to lock in prices and reduce exposure to volatility.

Domestic industrial policy also plays a role (14). Countries such as India have reduced their vulnerability to exchange rate swings by developing robust domestic pharmaceutical industries, enabling them to produce generic medicines at scale. While such industrial development is more challenging for smaller economies, regional production hubs offer a potential pathway for reducing dependence on volatile import markets.

The analysis of inflation and exchange rates underscores the inseparability of macroeconomic management and health policy. Stabilizing prices and currencies is not merely a technocratic exercise but a fundamental determinant of population well-being. Without price stability, health systems face chronic shortages, households confront declining real access to care, and donor resources lose effectiveness. Designing macroeconomic frameworks that explicitly account for health sector needs is therefore indispensable for achieving sustainable improvements in healthcare access in low-income countries.

4. Foreign Aid, Debt Relief, and Health Investment

Foreign aid and debt relief have profoundly shaped the fiscal possibilities for health investment in low-income countries (LICs). These instruments affect not only the size of the budget envelope but also its composition, predictability, and the incentives that guide public financial management. Over the past two decades, large initiatives such as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) freed resources that governments could reallocate to social sectors, including health (15). In the same period, health aid shifted toward disease-focused (“vertical”) programs, generating impressive disease-specific gains while sometimes leaving cross-cutting systems underfunded. This section develops formal frameworks to analyze these dynamics, distills the channels through which aid and debt relief influence health outcomes, and proposes design principles to make external financing a more reliable platform for accelerating universal health coverage.

4.1 A basic optimization framework and its interpretation

A convenient starting point is the government’s static resource allocation problem in a given period t :

$$\max_{G_h} U(H(G_h)) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad B_t + A_t \geq G_h + R_t,$$

where $U(\cdot)$ is increasing and concave in health outcomes H , G_h is public health expenditure, B_t denotes domestic budgetary resources, A_t is external aid (grants and the grant-equivalent of concessional loans), and R_t represents residual obligations, including debt service and other pre-committed expenditures. The Lagrangian is

$$\mathcal{L} = U(H(G_h)) + \lambda (B_t + A_t - G_h - R_t),$$

yielding the first-order condition

$$U_H H_G = \lambda,$$

where U_H is the marginal utility of health and H_G the marginal product of public health spending (16). The multiplier λ is the shadow value of public funds. Debt relief reduces R_t , shifting the constraint outward and, for a given B_t and A_t , lowers λ , thereby increasing the socially optimal G_h , provided $U_H H_G$ remains sufficiently large at higher spending levels.

This static representation clarifies the immediate allocative effect of debt relief and aid, but it suppresses intertemporal considerations. In practice, governments manage a dynamic problem with expectations over future revenues, aid disbursements, and shocks.

4.2 Intertemporal budget constraint and debt relief as a state shift

Let the government face an intertemporal budget constraint

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{G_{h,t} + G_{o,t}}{(1+r)^t} \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{B_t + A_t}{(1+r)^t} - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{R_t}{(1+r)^t},$$

where $G_{o,t}$ denotes all non-health primary expenditures and r the discount rate. HIPC/MDRI-type relief reduces the present value of R_t , creating fiscal space that can be allocated to $G_{h,t}$ without violating sustainability. Two features matter for health outcomes:

Timing. If relief arrives in a discrete tranche that lowers near-term debt service, it can finance lumpy investments in facilities, health worker training, and digital infrastructure that require upfront capital.

Credibility and durability. If relief is accompanied by macro-fiscal frameworks that keep debt on a sustainable path, the government can plan multi-year health commitments (e.g., payroll for nurses) with less risk of reversal.

In a stochastic setting, suppose A_t is mean zero around an expected path $\bar{A}$ with variance σ_A^2 , and the government is risk-averse over service delivery shortfalls. The value of *predictability* is then first order: a reduction in σ_A^2 can raise expected welfare even holding $\mathbb{E}[A_t]$ constant, because health production exhibits convex costs of disruption (e.g., stockouts, staff attrition).

4.3 Aid volatility, predictability, and smoothing instruments

Aid disbursements often deviate from commitments due to donor budget cycles, fiduciary concerns, or performance triggers. Let the flow of resources into the health sector be

$$S_t = \theta B_t + \phi A_t, \quad (17)$$

where $0 \leq \theta, \phi \leq 1$ capture budget execution rates. Health output Y_t depends on a nonlinear production function $F(\cdot)$ subject to adjustment costs $\Gamma(\cdot)$:

$$Y_t = F(S_t) - \Gamma(S_t - S_{t-1}).$$

With $\Gamma'(\cdot) > 0$ for large changes, volatility in A_t depresses average Y_t via higher adjustment costs even if $\mathbb{E}[S_t]$ is unchanged. This provides a rationale for buffers (e.g., health stabilization funds), countercyclical on-lending from development banks, or contingent financing clauses that disburse automatically when revenues fall. In practice, pooled funds and sector-wide approaches (SWAs) have sometimes reduced idiosyncratic volatility by diversifying across donors and aligning to national budget calendars. The key is to raise ϕ and stabilize A_t so that Γ remains small.

4.4 Mapping resources to outcomes: heterogeneity in efficiency

The relationship

$$\mathbf{Y} = \mathbf{B}\mathbf{X}$$

abstracts a complex reality in which $\mathbf{X}$ stacks inputs (aid by instrument and purpose, domestic allocations by program, health workforce, and capital), while $\mathbf{Y}$ stacks outputs (e.g., immunization coverage, effective coverage of maternal care, TB treatment success, and financial protection indicators). The

matrix $\mathbf{B}$ represents the transformation of inputs into outputs, incorporating technical efficiency, allocative efficiency, and governance quality. Cross-country heterogeneity in $\mathbf{B}$ is large:

- **Technical efficiency.** Procurement efficiency, supply-chain integrity, and maintenance practices affect how far a dollar stretches. Price dispersion for identical commodities (e.g., ACTs, bed nets) can be substantial, reflecting scale, competition, and integrity.
- **Allocative efficiency.** Spending patterns (primary care vs. tertiary hospitals; prevention vs. curative; across regions) determine output mix. Small shifts can yield large gains if the marginal cost-effectiveness gradient is steep.
- **Institutional and absorptive capacity.** Budget execution rates, payroll reliability, and facility autonomy influence how quickly additional funds translate into services. Weak public financial management (PFM) systems depress ϕ and θ in the S_i identity. (18)

An empirical approach to $\mathbf{B}$ estimation might combine frontier methods (e.g., stochastic frontier analysis) to estimate technical efficiency with program-level cost-effectiveness evidence to inform allocative efficiency. Importantly, $\mathbf{B}$ is not fixed: it responds to investments in systems (digital records, governance reforms, workforce training) and to the design of aid instruments themselves.

4.5 Vertical programs and system effects

Disease-specific programs targeting HIV, TB, and malaria have delivered measurable disease outcomes and mobilized unprecedented resources. Yet, strict earmarking can create distortions if it draws scarce managerial attention and staff away from primary care or if it creates parallel supply chains. The net system effect depends on integration design:

- **Positive spillovers.** HIV investments in laboratories and procurement can strengthen platforms used by maternal-child health and NCD services when open-access policies are adopted.
- **Negative spillovers.** Salary supplements tied to vertical programs may induce internal brain-drain from underfunded primary care, reducing effective coverage of essential services not covered by the vertical program.
- **Transition risk.** As countries grow and cross income thresholds, earmarked vertical funds may decline faster than domestic systems can absorb costs (e.g., antiretroviral therapy). Without transition planning, adherence and outcomes can suffer.

A robust strategy is *diagonal* financing: use disease-specific funds to finance system elements (e.g., health information systems, supply chains) that simultaneously lift multiple services. In a formal extension of the basic problem, let $G_{h,s}$ be allocated across k programs $g_1, \dots, g_k$ and cross-cutting systems s :

$$\max_{\{g_i, s\}} U(H(g_1, \dots, g_k, s)) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{i=1}^k g_i + s \leq B_t + A_t - R_t,$$

with cross-partial derivatives $\partial H_{g_i s} > 0$ representing complementarities. Vertical funds that force $s=0$ (or too low) reduce the marginal returns to g_i through $\partial H_{g_i s}$.

4.6 Fungibility, additionality, and incentives

A recurring policy concern is whether aid is *additional* (raising total health spending) or *fungible* (displacing domestic resources). In a two-budget framework, the government chooses (G_h, G_o) to maximize $U(H(G_h)) + V(G_o)$ subject to

$$G_h + G_o = B_t + A_t - R_t.$$

If donors earmark A_t for health, the government may optimally reduce B_t allocated to health ($\partial G_h / \partial A_t < 1$) to restore the preferred composition. Whether this is a problem depends on donors' objective: if they aim to raise H , partial displacement may still increase H ; if they aim to lift G_h specifically, displacement is an issue (19). Contract designs such as results-based financing (RBF) or matching grants can increase additionality by tying disbursements to outcomes or to domestic co-financing. From a welfare perspective, misalignment between donor and government objective functions can be more distortionary than fungibility per se.

4.7 Channels from debt relief to health outcomes

Debt relief affects health through multiple channels:

1. **Direct fiscal space.** Lower $\$R_t$ immediately increases discretionary space for $\$G_h$, enabling expansion of primary care, vaccine procurement, and essential medicines.
2. **Macroeconomic stabilization.** Reduced debt service can improve the current account and exchange rate stability, lowering the domestic cost of imported health commodities and smoothing cash flow.
3. **Creditworthiness and investment climate.** Better debt metrics can reduce borrowing costs for health infrastructure and facilitate public-private partnerships.
4. **Policy conditionality.** Relief often accompanies reforms in public financial management (PFM), procurement, and transparency, which can raise the effective $\mathbf{B}$ by improving efficiency and accountability.

However, if relief is followed by renewed borrowing without strong investment discipline, the gains can erode. Credible medium-term debt strategies and fiscal rules that protect social spending help convert temporary relief into sustained health improvement.

4.8 Sustainability and domestic revenue mobilization

Long-run financial sustainability hinges on domestic revenue. Aid can act as a bridge and a catalyst, but a durable path requires increased and more progressive revenue mobilization alongside efficiency gains. Key elements include:

Tax policy and administration. Closing VAT exemptions and improving compliance can raise non-volatile revenues. Excise taxes on tobacco, alcohol, and sugar-sweetened beverages simultaneously improve health and generate earmarkable revenue, though earmarks should not undermine budget flexibility. (20)

Pooling and prepayment. Transitioning away from out-of-pocket payments toward pooled financing (general revenue, social health insurance) increases financial protection and allows strategic purchasing that rewards value.

Provider payment and purchasing. Moving from line-item budgets to capitation, diagnosis-related groups, or performance-based contracts can realign incentives to quality and efficiency, expanding effective coverage for a given \$G_h\$.

Capital maintenance. Protecting operations and maintenance budgets is critical. Underspending on maintenance leads to rapid depreciation of health capital and raises future replacement costs, reducing the long-run productivity of \$G_h\$.

4.9 Risk and portfolio design of health aid

Consider a donor allocating a fixed health aid envelope A across instruments $j = 1, \dots, J$ with return vector μ (expected health gains) and covariance matrix Σ (volatility of disbursement/performance). If donor welfare is

$$W = \mathbf{w}^\top \mu - \frac{\gamma}{2} \mathbf{w}^\top \Sigma \mathbf{w}$$

over weights $\mathbf{w}$ that sum to 1, the mean-variance optimal portfolio tilts toward instruments with high return-to-risk. Instruments that co-finance system platforms (with lower volatility and positive externalities) can improve the efficient frontier. In practice, “blended” portfolios that combine targeted disease grants with system-strengthening tranches and countercyclical disbursement clauses can deliver higher expected welfare than single-instrument approaches.

4.10 Measurement, attribution, and empirical identification

Causal attribution is challenging due to simultaneity (aid flows respond to need and performance), measurement error, and spillovers. Strategies include:

- **Instrumental variables** using donor budget shocks or geopolitical instruments to isolate exogenous variation in A_t .
- **Difference-in-differences** around debt relief eligibility thresholds, comparing pre/post trends in social spending and outcomes to suitable controls.
- **Synthetic control** to construct counterfactuals for countries experiencing large debt relief or program scale-ups.
- **Micro-macro linkage** that follows resources from commitment $\rightarrow$ treasury $\rightarrow$ facility $\rightarrow$ patient, combining PFM data with facility surveys and health management information systems to estimate leakage and effective B .

Robust evaluation must also track *financial protection* outcomes (e.g., catastrophic health expenditure) alongside clinical indicators, because efficient systems that still rely heavily on out-of-pocket spending may deliver health gains at the cost of increased household vulnerability.

4.11 Governance, accountability, and PFM reform

Aid efficacy is mediated by PFM institutions: credible multi-year ceilings, on-time releases, transparent procurement, and timely financial reporting. Donors can support reforms that increase budget reliability for facilities (e.g., direct facility financing), integrate off-budget project spending into treasury systems, and standardize chart-of-accounts to tag health programs (21). Strengthened supreme audit institutions and community scorecards can reduce leakage, raising the effective elements of B .

4.12 Formal extension: optimal split between verticals and systems

Let total health resources $R = B_t + A_t - R_t$. The planner chooses $(\mathbf{g}, s)$ to maximize expected welfare subject to volatility costs:

$$\max_{\mathbf{g}, s} \mathbb{E}[U(H(\mathbf{g}, s))] - \kappa \text{Var}(F(\mathbf{g}, s)) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \mathbf{1}^\top \mathbf{g} + s \leq R,$$

with $H_{g_i s} > 0$ and diminishing returns in each g_i . The KKT conditions imply interior solutions where the risk-adjusted marginal benefits are equalized:

$$\mathbb{E}[U_H H_{g_i}] - \kappa \frac{\partial \text{Var}(F)}{\partial g_i} = \mu \quad \forall i, \quad \mathbb{E}[U_H H_s] - \kappa \frac{\partial \text{Var}(F)}{\partial s} = \mu,$$

for shadow price μ . Because systems spending s often reduces variance (better supply chains, data quality), the second term can be smaller for s , favoring higher s than would be implied by a purely static, variance-ignorant calculation.

4.13 Transition management and co-financing rules

As countries move up the income ladder, donors phase down grants or shift to loans. Without clear glidepaths and co-financing rules that anticipate fiscal pressures, service continuity risks increase (22). Transition-ready strategies include:

1. Multi-year co-financing compacts with explicit domestic revenue milestones;
2. Ring-fenced support for people on lifelong therapies during a defined period;
3. Pooled procurement platforms that maintain price advantages post-transition;
4. Technical assistance focused on purchasing and provider payment reforms to protect value.

4.14 Policy implications

Designing aid and debt relief to maximize health impact implies:

1. **Prioritize predictability over short-lived spikes.** Smooth, on-budget disbursements with credible medium-term envelopes can beat higher but volatile flows.
2. **Invest diagonally.** Use vertical funds to finance cross-cutting platforms with high H_{gis} .
3. **Embed countercyclical clauses.** Trigger-based disbursements protect essential services during downturns.
4. **Strengthen PFM and data.** Improve execution rates (θ, ϕ) and accountability to raise the effective $\mathbf{B}$.
5. **Plan transition early.** Link co-financing to domestic revenue milestones and purchasing reforms, not just to time elapsed.
6. **Safeguard operations and maintenance.** Avoid investment surges that are not matched by recurrent funding capacity.

Together, these principles turn external resources into a more reliable engine for universal health coverage, closing the gap between potential and realized health outcomes.

5. Demographic Transitions and Macroeconomic Constraints

Population dynamics shape both the demand for health services and the capacity to finance them. Age structure affects the tax base, dependency ratios, labor supply, savings behavior, and the epidemiological profile of need (23). In many LICs—especially in sub-Saharan Africa—rapid population growth has coincided with constrained fiscal space and underfunded systems, complicating the path to universal health coverage. This section formalizes key demographic concepts, links them to macroeconomic constraints and health financing, and articulates policies that convert demographic shifts into a true dividend rather than a liability.

5.1 Age structure, dependency, and fiscal capacity

A standard measure of dependency pressure is

$$D_r = \frac{P_{0-14} + P_{65+}}{P_{15-64}},$$

the ratio of dependents to the working-age population. High D_r compresses per capita fiscal capacity because most tax revenue is generated by the 15–64 group and because dependents (children and older persons) have higher per capita health needs per unit of income produced. Disaggregating D_r into youth dependency D_y and old-age dependency D_o matters for health planning: D_y is associated with high demand for maternal, newborn, and child health (MNCH) services and immunization, while D_o correlates with chronic disease management and long-term care.

In a simple tax model with wage bill W_t and average tax rate τ , public revenue $B_t \approx \tau W_t$ scales with the size and productivity of the working-age population. If P_{15-64} grows slower than dependents (or if productivity is stagnant), B_t grows too slowly to keep pace with health demand, widening the financing gap unless offset by efficiency gains or external resources.

5.2 The demographic dividend: a conditional opportunity

The demographic dividend hypothesis posits that as fertility declines and cohorts age into the labor force, the share of working-age population rises, potentially accelerating growth through higher savings, investment, and female labor force participation. But the dividend is not automatic (24). It is conditional on complementary investments in health, education, and job creation. Health is both a prerequisite and a beneficiary: healthier children become more productive adults; healthier adults supply more and higher-quality labor; healthier older persons require less intensive care for longer. Formally, let output per capita y_t depend on human capital h_t , physical capital k_t , and the share of working-age population ω_t :

$$y_t = A \cdot f(k_t, h_t, \omega_t),$$

with $f_h > 0$, $f_k > 0$, and $f_\omega > 0$, and h_t an increasing function of cumulative health investments. If fiscal contraction or debt overhang suppresses $G_{h,t}$, then h_{t+1} rises more slowly, weakening the responsiveness of y_t to changes in ω_t —a muted dividend.

5.3 A linear state-space representation of joint dynamics

Let $\mathbf{z}_t$ stack economic and health indices, e.g., $\mathbf{z}_t = [y_t, h_t, \omega_t]^\top$. A stylized linear approximation to the joint dynamics is

$$\mathbf{z}_t = \mathbf{N}\mathbf{z}_{t-1} + \mathbf{u}_t,$$

where $\mathbf{N}$ captures transition dynamics driven by demography and policy, and $\mathbf{u}_t$ collects shocks (terms-of-trade, epidemics, climate events). If the spectral radius $\rho(\mathbf{N}) < 1$, the system reverts to a low-growth steady state; if $\rho(\mathbf{N})$ can be lifted above unity for relevant sub-blocks (e.g., the (y, h) block), transitional growth can accelerate. Health investment shifts the elements of $\mathbf{N}$ by increasing the persistence and spillovers of h_t into y_t and by reducing the drag of dependency via lower child mortality and fertility (through the well-documented mortality–fertility link mediated by desired family size and human capital returns).

5.4 Cohort-component accounting and population momentum

Population evolves by age and sex according to the cohort-component method:

$$\mathbf{P}_{t+1} = \mathbf{T}(\mathbf{F}_t, \mathbf{M}_t, \mathbf{Q}_t) \mathbf{P}_t,$$

where $\mathbf{T}$ applies age-specific fertility $\mathbf{F}_t$, mortality $\mathbf{M}_t$, and migration $\mathbf{Q}_t$ to the age-structured population vector $\mathbf{P}_t$. *Population momentum* implies that even if fertility falls to replacement today, youthful age structures keep total population growing for decades as large cohorts age into childbearing years. Health planners must therefore anticipate sustained increases in absolute service volumes (births, vaccinations, school health) even as rates (e.g., total fertility rate) decline. This underscores the importance of scaling frontline capacity (midwives, nurses, community health workers) and supply chains, not just focusing on rates.

5.5 Macroeconomic constraints: savings, labor, and human capital

Classic life-cycle models imply that age structure affects aggregate savings: higher youth dependency reduces savings because families allocate more to childrearing; higher old-age dependency can increase or decrease savings depending on pension coverage and bequest motives (25). Savings influence investment and growth, feeding back into fiscal capacity. Health investments alter this loop by affecting survival, morbidity, and productivity. For instance, reductions in childhood stunting raise cognitive capital; control of infectious diseases reduces absenteeism; NCD prevention reduces later-life care costs, which might otherwise crowd out other public spending. These effects accumulate slowly but persistently, which is why short-run fiscal contractions that cut essential health investments can have large long-run opportunity costs.

5.6 Service delivery scale and unit cost dynamics

When population grows rapidly, the health system must expand along multiple margins:

- **Labor.** Scaling the health workforce requires long lead times due to training pipelines. Wage bill rigidities mean that failure to plan ahead leads to shortages or expensive, ad hoc hiring.
- **Capital.** Facilities and equipment require lumpy investment with maintenance commitments. Inadequate operations budgets raise effective unit costs through downtime and failures.
- **Geography.** Rapid urbanization concentrates demand in peri-urban areas, while remote regions risk abandonment. Spatial misalignment drives inefficiency via idle capacity in some areas and overload in others.
- **Technology.** Digital health platforms and supply chains can shift cost curves by improving productivity, but they too require upfront investment and recurrent support.

Unit costs may initially rise as systems stretch, then fall with scale if management and logistics improve (26). Strategic purchasing that rewards outputs and quality (rather than inputs) can help bring unit costs down even as volumes increase.

5.7 Epidemiological transition and fiscal implications

As countries move through the demographic transition, the disease burden shifts from infectious to chronic non-communicable diseases (NCDs), injuries, and mental health conditions. This alters the cost profile: chronic diseases entail sustained medication and monitoring; injuries require surgical capacity; mental health needs longitudinal, community-based services. If budgets and benefit packages are not updated, coverage lags behind need. Ignoring the epidemiological shift leads to rising out-of-pocket spending and financial hardship, undermining the social contract that underpins universal health coverage.

5.8 Gender dynamics, fertility, and labor supply

Female education and reproductive autonomy are pivotal to the demographic transition and to the realization of the demographic dividend. Access to voluntary family planning, respectful maternal care, and adolescent health services reduces unintended fertility and improves educational and labor outcomes for women. The resulting rise in female labor force participation increases $\$W_t$ and thus $\$B_t$, strengthening the fiscal base for health (27). Policies that remove barriers to women's employment (childcare, safe transport, anti-discrimination enforcement) amplify these effects.

5.9 Stability analysis with policy interventions

Extend the linear system to include a policy vector $\mathbf{g}_t$ of health and education investments:

$$\mathbf{z}_t = \mathbf{N}\mathbf{z}_{t-1} + \mathbf{G}\mathbf{g}_t + \mathbf{u}_t,$$

with $\mathbf{G}$ mapping policy to state changes. Suppose $\mathbf{g}_t$ is constrained by the macro-fiscal environment, including debt limits and revenue capacity. If well-designed policies increase the dominant eigenvalue of the (γ, h) sub-system above unity while keeping debt sustainable, the economy can enter a high-growth transition path. Conversely, if shocks (pandemics, droughts) reduce h_t or force procyclical cuts to $\mathbf{g}_t$, the system can slip back toward stagnation. This formalism clarifies the value of countercyclical external support that protects $\mathbf{g}_t$ during downturns.

5.10 Fragility, conflict, and demographic pressure

In many settings, fragility and conflict interact with demography: youthful age structures with limited economic opportunity can raise the risk of instability (the “youth bulge” hypothesis), which in turn disrupts services, lowers h_t , and damages capital. Health investments focused on resilience—community-based delivery, decentralized supply chains, and mobile outreach—can partially insulate service delivery from shocks, preserving human capital during crises and enabling faster recovery.

5.11 Empirical approaches to quantify demographic-health-growth links

Causal estimation requires careful design:

- **Exogenous fertility variation** (e.g., from family planning program rollouts or policy changes) can identify effects on female labor supply and child outcomes.
- **Panel VAR models** can capture feedback among γ_t, h_t, ω_t and help estimate impulse responses to health investment shocks.
- **Growth accounting with human capital** can quantify the contribution of improved health (e.g., declines in stunting or malaria prevalence) to labor productivity growth.
- **Cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness** frameworks translate demographic investments into present value terms, facilitating comparison with infrastructure or debt service trade-offs.

While point estimates vary by context, a consistent qualitative result is that early-life health investments have high returns that persist across decades, magnified when the working-age share is rising.

5.12 Policy package for harnessing the dividend

A practical package has three pillars:

(1) Enable voluntary fertility decline. Scale rights-based family planning, comprehensive sexuality education, and respectful MNCH services. Integrate with girls' secondary education and legal reforms that delay early marriage.

(2) Build human capital at scale. Guarantee an essential service package with strong primary care; invest in nutrition (especially the first 1,000 days); integrate school health and vaccination; expand mental health services.

(3) Create jobs and align skills. Pair health and education investments with labor market policies (infrastructure, business climate, targeted apprenticeships) to absorb larger cohorts into productive employment.

Cross-cutting enablers include digital identification for enrollment in insurance schemes, civil registration and vital statistics to track births and deaths, and strategic purchasing that rewards quality and coverage expansion. (28)

5.13 Sub-Saharan Africa: specific challenges and opportunities

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) illustrates the tension between demographic pressure and fiscal constraints. Many SSA countries still have high total fertility rates and rapidly growing cohorts entering school and later the labor market. Fiscal capacity is stretched by narrow tax bases and debt-service burdens. Yet, SSA also has the world's largest prospective increase in working-age population. With sustained investments in primary care, infectious disease control, and NCD prevention, coupled with education and job creation, SSA can convert population growth into a dividend. Conversely, if health systems remain underfunded and volatile, the dividend will be delayed or dissipated.

Progress in under-five mortality reduction in SSA has been real but uneven, and maternal mortality remains high in several contexts. Fiscal consolidations that cut MNCH budgets or slow health worker hiring can reverse gains. The policy implication echoes Section 1: smoothing health expenditure and protecting essential services during macroeconomic adjustments are not luxuries; they are prerequisites for long-run growth. (29)

5.14 Integrating demographic realities into macro-fiscal frameworks

Medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs) and debt sustainability analyses (DSAs) should internalize demographic projections and the long-run returns to health. Traditional

DSAs penalize upfront investments by recording costs immediately while spreading benefits diffusely over time. A complementary "human capital DSA" would (i) incorporate the impact of $G_{h,t}$ on future revenues through higher productivity and labor force participation, and (ii) account for the additional welfare costs of volatility in $G_{h,t}$, given the convex disruptions caused by interruptions in service delivery (Section 1). Integrating these elements would support the case for protected floors for essential health spending, countercyclical financing instruments, and concessional resources directed toward demographic pressure points (e.g., rapidly growing urban peripheries).

5.15 Scenario analysis and planning

Consider two scenarios over a 20-year horizon:

Baseline. Health spending grows with GDP but experiences periodic cuts during downturns; family planning coverage expands slowly; primary care remains under-resourced; NCD services lag. The working-age share rises but productivity gains are modest. Dependency declines slowly; fiscal space is tight; out-of-pocket payments remain high.

High-investment path. Front-loaded investment expands MNCH, family planning, and adolescent services; supply chains and data platforms are strengthened; health workforce training scales; strategic purchasing improves efficiency; NCD prevention and primary care management expand. Voluntary fertility decline accelerates; child health improves; the working-age share rises faster; productivity increases through better health and education. Fiscal space improves via higher revenues and reduced catastrophic spending that destabilizes households. External partners provide predictable, countercyclical support to smooth the path. (30)

Under the second scenario, the eigenvalues of the $\$(y,h)\$$ dynamics rise, enabling a sustained growth trajectory with stronger health outcomes and financial protection.

Demography does not dictate destiny. The same population trajectory can yield either a burden or a dividend depending on health investment, system design, and macro-fiscal management. Low-income countries facing rapid demographic change need health financing that is sufficient, predictable, and strategically allocated. Debt relief and well-designed aid can catalyze this shift by enlarging and stabilizing the budget constraint, but only if paired with system investments that raise the transformation matrix **B** and with policies that protect essential services during macroeconomic downturns. When demographic realities are embedded within macro-fiscal frameworks—and when external financing is structured to support steadiness, system strengthening, and transition readiness—population dynamics become an asset rather than a constraint.

6. Epidemiological Shocks and Macroeconomic Policy Responses

The past two decades have been punctuated by significant epidemiological shocks that have revealed the vulnerabilities of both health systems and macroeconomic frameworks in low-income countries. The HIV/AIDS epidemic, Ebola outbreaks, and more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic have underscored the feedback loops between health crises and economic stability.

The economic cost of epidemics can be expressed through a loss function:

$$L_t = \lambda_1 Y_t + \lambda_2 H_t + \nu_t, \quad (31)$$

where Y_t denotes lost output, H_t reflects increased health burden, and ν_t is a stochastic disturbance capturing spillover effects. Governments often respond to such crises with emergency fiscal expansions, financed through external borrowing or monetary accommodation. However, these responses frequently exacerbate pre-existing macroeconomic vulnerabilities, such as inflationary pressures or rising debt ratios.

The Ebola crisis of 2014 in West Africa demonstrated how an epidemiological shock can collapse economic activity, with GDP contracting by over 12% in some affected countries. At the same time, diversion of resources to emergency response undermined ongoing health programs, creating a vicious cycle of reduced resilience. Linear dynamic models of epidemic response highlight how the interaction between public expenditure, debt accumulation, and health capacity evolves over time:

$$\mathbf{s}_{t+1} = \mathbf{Q}\mathbf{s}_t + \mathbf{w}_t,$$

where $\mathbf{s}_t$ represents state variables including health system capacity and fiscal balance, $\mathbf{Q}$ encodes transmission of policy effects, and $\mathbf{w}_t$ denotes exogenous shocks. Stability analysis of $\mathbf{Q}$ reveals that without sustained investment in resilient health systems, future shocks amplify rather than diminish over time.

The COVID-19 pandemic further illustrated this phenomenon, with debt ratios soaring across low-income countries as fiscal deficits widened to finance emergency health responses and social protection. The long-term implication is a reduction in fiscal space for sustained health investment, thereby perpetuating the vulnerability cycle.

7. Conclusion

This research has examined the interrelationships between macroeconomic policies and public health outcomes in low-income countries over the past two decades, demonstrating the complexity and multidimensionality of these linkages (32). Fiscal stability, debt management, inflation control, and external aid all play critical roles in shaping the resources available for healthcare provision. The mathematical models presented in this paper underscore the systemic interdependencies between policy instruments and health outcomes, illustrating how shocks in one domain propagate across others.

The evidence from the past twenty years indicates that while macroeconomic stabilization has provided important

gains in terms of inflation reduction and debt sustainability, these gains have often come at the expense of constrained public health spending. External aid and debt relief have temporarily alleviated these pressures, but structural vulnerabilities remain, particularly in contexts of high dependency ratios and weak institutional capacity. Epidemiological shocks have repeatedly exposed the fragility of both macroeconomic and health systems, creating feedback loops that undermine resilience.

The overarching conclusion is that macroeconomic policy and public health outcomes cannot be treated in isolation. Effective development strategies require an integrated framework that recognizes the bidirectional influences between fiscal discipline and population well-being. Linear algebraic modeling demonstrates that sustainable improvements in health outcomes depend on maintaining systemic stability across both domains. For low-income countries, the challenge ahead lies in designing macroeconomic policies that preserve stability while expanding the fiscal space for critical health investments, thereby enabling resilient and inclusive growth. (33)

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